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DEVOLUTION AND DISTRUST: MANAGED CARE
AND THE RESURGENCE OF PHYSICIAN POWER
AND AUTHORITY
Carl F. Ameringer*
INTRODUCTION
The decline of organized medicine as a political force in the latter half
of the twentieth century is well known. Reasons for the decline include
government subsidization of health care and the corresponding growth
of commercial enterprise, the application of the antitrust laws to the
"learned professions," and the consumer challenge to medical authority
and self-regulation. Medicine's downfall created a power vacuum for
others to fill. Government seemed the logical choice based on models
advanced in other countries, such as Canada and Great Britain, but the
timing was poor for the type of regulation that characterized the New
Deal era and the administrative state. Policy makers eschewed
centralized authority in favor of market competition to stem rising
costs. Corporate medicine emerged the victor, thanks in no small part
to legislative enactments,' court rulings,2 and the support of government
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission.3
*J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University. Carl F.
Ameringer is the Director of the Graduate Program in Public Administration at the University
of Wisconsin-Oshkosh.
1See Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 and amendments thereto.
2 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982)
(horizontal agreement among participating physicians to fix maximum prices for medical
services violated the antitrust laws).
3 See, e.g., In the Matter of The American Medical Association, et. al., 94 F.T.C. 701
(1979) (ethical restrictions on physician advertising, solicitation and contract practice were in
restraint of trade); In the Matter of Michigan State Medical Society, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983) (the
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Though organized medicine is 'just a player" in health politics at
the present time,4 there are clear signs that physicians and their
professional associations are regaining some of their lost political clout
and economic leverage.5 These signs include: (1) collaborative efforts
between organized medicine and consumer groups at the state and local
levels to advance common interests, such as patient protection
legislation; (2) the recent SuPreme Court decision in California Dental
Association v. FTC (1999) that reinforces professional values; (3)
liberalization of the rules on physician efforts to organize in response to
managed care organizations (MCOs); and (4) structural changes in the
private market that indicate that physicians are adapting to a
competitive environment. Collectively, these events signal a new
framework for the exercise of political and economic authority within a
reconfigured and fragmented professional landscape. This article will
examine the evidence, will explore why physicians are regaining power,
and will assess the significance for health policy.
Gaining Leverage Through Collaboration
The medical profession acquired political power, in large part, by
controlling the institutions and individuals that provided health care in
local communities.7 The mechanisms of institutional control included
credentialing and privileging committees of hospitals, medical staff by-
laws and procedures, and private accrediting bodies; the mechanisms of
Michigan State Medical Society illegally conspired to boycott the cost containment programs
of Michigan Medicaid and Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan).
4See C.S. WEISSERT AND W.G. WEISSERT, GOVERNING HEALTH: THE POLITICS OF HEALTH
PoLIcy 100 (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1996); R.A. Stevens, Public Roles for the Medical
Profession in the United States: Beyond Theories of Decline and Fall, 79 THE MIInANK
QUARTERLY 327 (2001).
5Recent studies lend support to my thesis. M. Schlesinger, A Loss of Faith: The Sources of
Reduced Political Legitimacy for the American Medical Profession, 80 THE MmBANK QuARTERLY
190 (2002); Stevens, supra note 4. Schlesinger's data show that public confidence in medical
authority "rebounded" in the mid-1990s following a decline that began in the 1960s. Stevens
questions the historical portrayal of a profession in decline. She notes that todays "environment
requires collaborative planning, management, and policymaking rather than conflicts," and that "it
is easier to see than it was 10 years ago that public interest and professional self-interest are not
necessarily, or even usefully, antagonistic." Id.. at 337, 347.
6526 U.S. 756 (1999).
7See P. STARR, THE SOcIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICmE (Basic Books
1982).
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individual control included professional associations, medical schools,
licensing boards, and the ethical principles they enforced. Though
professional control undoubtedly enhanced competence and quality, the
effect was to exclude competing practitioners (chiropractors,
podiatrists, etc.) and to restrict the corporate practice of medicine.
8
Those lacking access to private institutions and to the closed referral
and fee-generating systems asserted that quality was a guise for
economic self-interest.9  But until the federal government enacted
Medicare and Medicaid and health care costs rose dramatically in the
1970s, there was no concerted effort to undermine the medical
establishment.
The erosion of professional power at the local level began with the
introduction of rules and regulations at the federal level. The political
scientist E. E. Schattschneider wisely observed that "inevitably the
outcome of a contest is controlled by the level at which the decision is
made." 10 What Schattschneider meant was that weak contestants in a
political battle must seek to "expand the scope of conflict" in order to
gain leverage with more powerful opponents. One way to expand
conflict is to "nationalize" it," just as chiropractors, insurers, and
HMOs did throughout the 1980s and 1990s when they appealed to
federal authorities to protect them from anticompetitive practices of
local and state medical societies and other professional groups. 12 So
long as federal rules prevailed and independent practitioners could not
organize competitively, corporate providers dominated at the state and
8C.F. Ameringer, Organized Medicine on Trial. The Federal Trade Commission vs. The
American Medical Association, 12 J. POLICY HISTORY 461 (2000).
9See Trial Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint [of the FTC against the AMA],
Docket No. 9064 (filed 18 April 1977), 53-78. See also Federal Trade Commission
Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Congress, House, Subcomm. on Commerce,
Transportation, and Tourism, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1982)
(statements of the American College of Nurse-Midwives, the American Optometric
Association, the American Chiropractors Association, the Association for the Advancement of
Psychology, and the American Nurses' Association).
10E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REAuST's VMW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 11 (Dryden Press 1975) (1960).
"Id. at 10.
12See, e.g., Michigan State Medical Society, supra note 3; Wilk v. American Medical
Association, 895 F.2d 352, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990) (AMA boycott against
chiropractors constituted illegal restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws).
2002]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[
local levels.13 As Clark Havighurst has noted: "Few things could have
had as revolutionary an effect on the health care sector as the abrupt
overturning of the deep-seated policy of trusting medical interests to
make and enforce industry rules and set standards for the health care
field."14
These events might seem at odds with the decentralizing and
deregulating trends in American government over the past thirty years.
They are not. In order to enhance efficiency through market
competition, government sought to break up the medical monopoly.
1 5
Despite an overall decrease in federal antitrust actions during the
Reagan administration, filings actually increased against professional
and trade associations. 16 In addition, the federal government enacted
laws and regulations, such as fraud-and-abuse statutes and HMO
legislation, that fostered market competition while encouraging
physicians to integrate with institutional providers and health insurers. 17
After the Clinton administration failed to fashion a national health
plan that cobbled public oversight with private delivery, the federal
government again retreated to the sidelines, leaving it to MCOs and
professional associations to police the private sector. Though
diminished federal involvement enhanced opportunities for state
regulation and professional control, managed care now was a key
participant in the private sector. Having declined politically, a much-
weakened medical profession lacked the clout to oppose MCOs and
insurers on its own. Seeking assistance, physicians cultivated ties with
13See E.A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUELDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF
CAPrrAUSM, 1930 TO PRESENT (Yale University Press 1996); L.D. BROWN, POLrIcs AND
HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION: HMOs AS FEDERAL POLICY (The Brookings Institution 1983).
14 C.C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26 J.
HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW 942 (2001).
'
5 J.C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: COMPETITION AND
INNOVATION IN HEALTH CARE (University of California Press 1999); W.R. ScoTT, M. RuEF, P.J.
MENDEL, C.A. CARONNA, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS: FROM
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE TO MANAGED CARE (University of Chicago Press 2000).
'
6 M.A. EISNER, ANTITrRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS: INSTITUTIONS, EXPERTISE,
AND POLICY CHANGE 222 (The University of North Carolina Press 1991).
17P.P. Budetti et al., Physiciansand Health System Integration, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 206
(2001); D. Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity:
Referrals among Health Care Providers, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1861-1938 (1989).
18P.D. Jacobson, Regulating Health Care: From Self-Regulation to Self-Regulation?, 26
J. HEALTHPOI/TICS, POLICY AND LAW 1171-1173 (2001).
[Vol. 5:187
DEVOLUTION AND DISTRUST
consumers by asserting that many of the devices that corporate
managers used to control physicians (utilization review, gag clauses,
financial incentives, etc.) were bad for patient care.19 Physicians were
effective in their campaign, fueling a public backlash against the
managed care industry.
Consumers also were searching for new allies. According to
Louise Trubek, the movement of authority downward from federal to
state and local government, outward to the private sector, and outside
the "regulatory box" reconfigured the political landscape, fostering
"collaboration among previously antagonistic actors., 21 She argues that
in an uncertain regulatory environment, consumer advocates sought
22help from groups that shared an interest in the quality of health care.
A weakened medical profession was a likely candidate because of the
perception that doctors were advocates for their patients against
MCOs.2 3  Trubek relates that physician and consumer groups in
Wisconsin founded the Collaboration for Healthcare Consumer
Protection (CHCP) to promote legislation and other initiatives that
advanced patients' rights.
24
Trubek's findings are consistent with my own study of advocacy
coalitions in Wisconsin politics. 2 After conducting numerous
interviews with legislative staff and with leaders and lobbyists from
19See T. Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary?, 335 NMV ENG.
J. MED. 1601-1604 (1996); M.A. Peterson, ed., Special Issue-The Managed Care Backlash, J.
OF HEALTH PoLmcs, POLICY AND LAW 24 (1999); J.A. MARSTELLER AND R.R. BOVBJERG,
FEDERALISM AND PATIENT PROTECTION: CHANGING ROLES FOR STATE AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT (The Urban Institute, 1999); D. Mechanic, The Managed Care Backlash:
Perceptions and Rhetoric in Health Care Policy and the Potential for Health Care Reform, 79
THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 35-54 (2001).201d.
21L.G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for
Healthcare, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 575, 586.
22Id.
23Cf., D. Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical
Care, 23 J. OF HEALTH POLTCS, POLICY AND LAW 668 (1998).24CHCP comprises the Center for Public Representation, the Medical Society of
Milwaukee County, the State Medical Society of Wisconsin, Wisconsin AARP, the Wisconsin
Nurses Association, and the Wisconsin Society of Podiatric Medicine. Letter from CHCP to
Governor McCallum, Representative Jensen, and Senator Chvala (Feb. 16, 2001).
25C.F. Ameringer, Patients, Providers, and Attorneys: Holding Managed Care
Accountable for Health Care Decisions (Nov. 7-10, 2001). (paper presented at the 73rd annual
meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta).
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consumer groups, the managed care industry, and professional
societies, I also found that groups with past differences were now
26
working together to fashion legislation. Of particular note, I learned
that the state medical society in Wisconsin had altered its strategy to
emphasize "patient advocacy" over "doctor advocacy" in the pursuit of
27professional goals. Still, medical societies conceded little in
promoting the interests of consumers. An agenda that furthered
patients' rights countered federal policies that sought to streamline
medical practice in order to reduce costs.
28
These findings suggest that collaborative activities between
physicians and consumers at the state level, combined with growing
public distrust of managed care during the 1990s, furthered the political
29
agenda of organized medicine. Congress thus far has failed to pass
comprehensive legislation or an antitrust exemption for physicians.
26The events were more complex, of course, than this brief summary suggests. The
advocacy coalitions that I identified represented a broad spectrum of beliefs and values from
professional and public interest groups to managed care organizations. Moreover, groups and
coalitions were divided among themselves on certain issues. For example, the Milwaukee
County Medical Society disagreed with the State Medical Society on data collection
legislation, and preferred provider organizations in Wisconsin broke ranks with HMOs over
patient protection legislation.27State Medical Society of Wisconsin, Strategic Plan, SMS File, (Oct. 17, 1998).28A good example is the distinction between state insurance regulation and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). State laws ("any willing provider"
legislation, mandated benefits, emergency room coverage, etc.) promote individual access to
medical services with little regard for cost. ERISA, on the other hand, limits the rights of plan
beneficiaries in the attempt to preserve scarce resources. See B.R. FURRow ET AL., HEALTH
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 624-625 (American Casebook Series, West Group,
4th ed., 2001).29Some evidence exists that physicians are better organized at the state and local levels than
at the federal level relative to their managed care counterparts. Physician membership in state
medical societies surpasses that of the AMA. Interview with A. O'Connor, Vice President,
Advocacy and Policy, Wisconsin State Medical Society (Aug. 15, 2001). Moreover, an increasing
number of doctors are running for political office, particularly at the state level where 30 state
legislatures had physician members in 2001. T. Albert, W. Va. Liability Crisis Motivates Doctors
to Become Candidates, AM. MBD. Naws, June 17, 2002. Further, the managed care industry has
concentrated its political resources on Congress where it has contributed enormous sums to defeat
consumer rights' initiatives. L. Berger et al., Holding Patients Hostage: The Unhealthy Alliance
Between HMOs & Senate Leaders, PUBLIC CMZEN'S CONGRESS WATCH (2000); Congress, House,
Committee on the Judiciary, The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999: Hearing Before the
Congress, House, Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., (1st Sess. 1999) [hereinafter House
Hearings (1999)].
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Most states, on the other hand, have enacted some form of patient
protection legislation that favors physicians in the form of any-willing-
provider laws, restrictions on gag clauses in contracts, state licensure
requirements for medical directors of HMOs, and prompt payment
laws. Even a few states (Washington, Texas, and New Jersey) have
authorized independent practitioners to bargain collectively with MCOs
under certain circumstances. 3 1  In state legislatures, at least,
professional goals and interests have trumped those of managed care.
The Revitalization of Medical Ethics
For much of the twentieth century, the medical profession argued that
the commercialization of medicine would be bad for patient care,32 and,
for a long time, the courts agreed. Faced with a physician-led boycott
of hospital associations in Oregon over prepaid medical care, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Oregon Medical Society (1952)33
upheld a lower court decision that found insufficient evidence to
support a conspiracy. Perhaps the Court's own values and beliefs
colored its decision. In the words of the Court: "There are ethical
considerations where the historic direct relationship between patient
and physician is involved which are quite different than the usual
considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. This Court
has recognized that forms of competition usual in the business world
may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession." 
34
Before the Court's historic turnabout in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar (1975),35 the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics restricted
advertising, solicitation, and contract practice. 3 6  Constraints on
advertising and solicitation prevented physicians from competing based
on price or quality of service. The prohibition on contract practice,
which precluded certain types of compensation, such as capitation, and
certain arrangements between physicians and non-physicians, adversely
30See Marsteller, supra note 19.
31A.S. Landa, N.J. Doctors Get Collective Bargaining Rights, AMERICAN MEDICAL
Naws, Jan. 28, 2002.32See Start, supra note 7.
33343 U.S. 326 (1952).341d. at 336.
35421 U.S. 773 (1975).
3694 F.T.C. at 801.
2002]
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affected HMOs and alternative providers. Though the Court in
Goldfarb exposed the "learned professions" to antitrust scrutiny, it
expressed some ambivalence over the reach of the antitrust laws, stating
in footnote 17 that professional activities might merit special treatment
because of their "public service aspect and other features of the
professions. 37 When the Federal Trade Commission sued the AMA in
1975 in an attempt to alter the AMA's restrictions on advertising,
solicitation, and contract practice, the AMA invoked footnote 17,
asserting that such restrictions were reasonable attempts to prevent
consumer deception and inferior medical care.
3 8
In the first of many rulings against organized medicine and various
professional groups, the FTC in 1979 dismissed the AMA's claims,
observing that the restrictions went "far beyond anything that might
reasonably be related to the goals" of protecting consumers from
deceptive advertising or patients from poor medical care. 39 Subsequent
FTC and Supreme Court rulings narrowed the scope of footnote 17. In
Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986),40
for example, the Court circumscribed the so-called "patient care
defense," holding that dentists could not keep x-rays from insurers on
the grounds that such information, unaccompanied by a full dental
examination, might lead to inadequate care and treatment. Relying on
its earlier decision in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States (1978),'4 the Court employed a truncated rule-of-reason
analysis to quickly dismiss the dentists' assertions.
37421 U.S. at 788-789, n. 17. The complete quotation is as follows:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular
restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the
practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities,
and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which
originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly
be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated
differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with
which we are confronted today.38Trial Brief of Respondent American Medical Association, Docket No. 9064 (Aug. 19,
1977), 54.
3994 F.T.C. at 1011-1012.
40476 U.S. 447 (1986).
41435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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At the time of the Court's ruling in California Dental Association• • 42
v. Federal Trade Commission (1999), legal scholars, for the most
part, believed that professional associations could not rely on the
underlying public policy implications of footnote 17 to advance
restrictive trade practices, except in very limited circumstances.
43
California Dental resurrected footnote 17. In California Dental, the
Supreme Court reversed the findings of the FTC and the Ninth Circuit
on the grounds that "the rule of reason requires a more thorough
enquiry into the consequences" of certain restrictions on advertising.'4
The ethical provisions at issue prohibited members of the state dental
society from advertising discounts for dental work and for extolling the
quality of their dental services. Using a "quick look" rule-of-reason
analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that the anticompetitive tendencies of
the restrictions were intuitively obvious,45 but a bare majority (5 to 4)
of the Supreme Court did not agree. Instead, the Court held that the
facts justified a "full-bore" analysis because "the restrictions on both
discount and nondiscount advertising are, at least on their face,
designed to avoid false or deceptive advertising in a market
characterized by striking disparities between the information available
to the professional and the patient." 
46
The Court's holding in California Dental affirmed the role of
professional societies in regulating certain forms of advertising, even
non-deceptive advertising, so long as the avowed goal was to avoid the
dissemination to consumers of false or misleading information. This is
a role that the Court arguably foreclosed in Professional Engineers and
in Indiana Federation ofDentists. Further, in relying on footnote 17 to
bolster their decision, a majority of the Justices signaled their
willingness to view favorably professional norms and values in future
cases involving ethical restrictions on business practices. Critics of the
Court's decision are wary. Indeed, Clark Havighurst claims that, "by
42526 U.S. 756 (1999).
43Havighurst, supra note 14, at 946-949; T.L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market
Failure Defenses in Antitrust Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REv. 608-622 (1989).
44526 U.S. at 759.451d. at 763-764, 784.461d. at 771.
471d. at 771, n. 10.48See Havighurst, supra note 14, at 949-953; T.L Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The
2002]
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raising the burden of proof facing anyone challenging certain
professional restraints of trade, the Court has created a new risk that
professionals will once again be empowered to control their economic
environment in their own interests, potentially reversing much of the
progress in antitrust enforcement against professionals in the quarter
century since Goldfarb."49
Though physicians are unlikely to regain monopoly powers,
particularly with the advent of managed care, California Dental has
broad implications for organized medicine. Specifically, the ruling
bolsters (and may even expand) professional oversight in the sensitive
area of economic self-regulation. As discussed in the next section, the
FTC has relaxed its position on physician-network joint ventures, but
has been reluctant to cede control over professional practices that
impinge on market competition.50 Whether California Dental will have
a "chilling effect" on the Commission's enforcement activities remains
to be seen. Some believe that it already has, though the FTC was
proceeding in other directions even before California Dental.5 1  Still,
the Court's decision and the Ninth Circuit's subsequent dismissal of the
case, without remanding it to the FTC for further proceedings,52 might
deter future lawsuits for restraints of trade.
Collective Actions in Response to MCOs
Physicians have sought to remove constraints on their concerted
economic activity ever since the application of the antitrust laws to the
"learned professions." The AMA petitioned Congress for relief from
FTC jurisdiction beginning in 1980. After securing passage of a bill in
the House placing a moratorium on FTC prosecutions, the AMA lost in
the Senate in 1982.53 Following the AMA's defeat, the Commission,
Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRs 189-190 (2002);
T.J. Muris, The Rule of Reason After California Dental, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 527 (2000).49Havighurst, supra note 14, at 949.
5
°See U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n [DOJ/FTC], Statement ofAntitrust
Enforcement in Health Policy (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm; R.
Pitofsky, Thoughts on 'Leveling the Playing Field' in Health Care Markets, Speech before the
National Health Lawyers Association Twentieth Annual Program on Antitrust in the Health
Care Field, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 13, 1997).
51See Greaney, supra note 48, at 186.
52224 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2000).53Senate Record Vote Analysis, vote no. 428, 97th Cong., (2d Sess. 1982).
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the Department of Justice, and state attorneys general brought
numerous lawsuits charging health care professionals with price fixing,
boycotts, and restraint of trade; the FTC pursued at least 27 of these
cases, most of them against the medical profession.
54
During the 1990s, organized medicine continued to press for
Congressional relief from the antitrust laws. The Medicare
Preservation Act of 1995 sought broad immunity for collaborative
activities related to the setting of quality standards, and limited
immunity for fee-setting among certain provider networks. 55 Similar
legislation to ease restrictions on provider networks surfaced again in
1996.56 Each of these attempts was unsuccessful. Finally, in 1996, the
FTC and the Department of Justice issued joint guidelines that
established "antitrust safety zones" and otherwise clarified the standards
for financial risk-sharing and the clinical integration of physicians'
groups.
57
Despite some easing of the restrictions on physician integration,
many doctors remained unhappy with the perceived disparity in
negotiating leverage between them and the insurance industry.58
According to the AMA's general counsel, Edward Hirshfeld, "this
leverage has enabled health plans to assume substantial control over
medical decision making, to drive down the incomes of many
physicians, and to threaten the viability of physician practices that will
not cooperate with them., 59 Though the number of doctors in group
practices increased substantially after 1965, most self-employed
physicians remained in solo-or small-group practices (2 to 4 physicians)
as of 1998. These physicians, in particular, continued to press for
5See House Hearings (1999), supra note 29, at 24-30.
551.R. 2425.
56See H.R. 2925 & R. Pitofsky, Prepared Statement Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
Congress, House, (Feb. 27, 1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky.
57See DOJ/FTC Statement, supra note 50.55See American Medical Association, Board of Trustees Rep. 30, Collective Bargaining
as an Advocacy Tool, in Proceedings of the House of Delegates (Reference Comm. 11999).591d. appendix A, at 29.
6OSelf-employed physicians comprised 52.4% of practicing physicians in 1998. Of these,
21.7% or 134,802 were in practice by themselves and 13.2% or 81,802 physicians were in
practices numbering less than five physicians. D. Emmons and P. Kletke, The Practice
Arrangements of Patient Care Physicians, 1998 (AMA Center for Health Policy Research
1999).
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antitrust relief.61  They supported legislation sponsored by Tom
Campbell, a Republican Congressman from California, that would
allow them to bargain collectively with insurers and HMOs.
62
Originally introduced in 1998, the Campbell bill targeted self-
employed physicians, not employees of insurers or HMOs.
Reintroduced in 1999 and 2000, the proposed legislation passed by a
vote of 276 to 136 in the House of Representatives, but failed to gain a
sponsor in the Senate. 63 Though physicians lost at the federal level,
they enjoyed some success at the state level. Texas, Washington, and
New Jersey enacted modest forms of collective bargaining legislation
on behalf of doctors, most recently in 2002. 64 Moreover, Congress is
again considering antitrust relief in the current legislative session.
65
The so-called Barr-Conyers bill would require the FTC to apply "rule of
reason" analysis to collective negotiations by independent physicians
and would establish at least six demonstration projects to study the
effects of such arrangements on competition.
66
Advocates of market competition in the health care industry have
expressed concern over this recent legislative activity. According to
Thomas Greaney, "legislators' newfound interest in exempting
collective bargaining is startling not only because it represents a
substantial reversal of long-standing policy and legal precedent,...but
also because of the thin justifications on which exemption rests." 67
Among the "thin justifications" that Greaney disputes is the assertion
that enhancement of physicians' bargaining position bolsters quality-of-
care.
Organized medicine often has conflated quality concerns with
medical ethics and economic self-interest. During the debate over the
Campbell bill, for instance, the AMA argued that "the role of physician
as patient advocate never has been more critical than in the current
6lAMA, supra note 58, at 29.
62Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1998 (H.R. 4277); 1999 (H.R. 1304); 2000 (H.R.
1304). 63T. Albert, Collective Bill Needs Senate Nod, AMERICAN MEDICAL Nvws (Jan. 15,
2001).
64See Landa, supra note 31.
6 5T. Albert, Physician Collective Bargaining Bill Returns, AMERICAN MEDICAL NVS
(Mar. 25, 2002).
66The Health Care Antitrust Improvements Act of 2002, (H.R. 3897).
67Greaney, supra note 48, at 191-192.
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environment. Ironically, the antitrust laws--which were intended to
protect the Davids of the world against the Goliaths--are having the
opposite effect in the health care market, and are making it virtually
impossible for many physicians to have any leverage with healthxlans
over patient care issues. 6 8  In American Medical Association, the
AMA asserted that restrictions on advertising, solicitation, and contract
practice were necessary to protect consumers and to ensure quality
medical care; in Michigan State Medical Society,70 professional leaders
justified their boycott of Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Michigan
Medicaid, in part, because reduced fees would limit access and impair
patient care; and in Wilk v. American Medical Association,71 the AMA
claimed that concerns for patient safety warranted its boycott of the
chiropractic profession.
As I discovered in my research concerning the passage of patient
protection legislation in Wisconsin, political coalitions mirror the
relative importance that groups place on the goals of access, cost, and
quality.72 Because the public most closely associates physicians with
quality care and MCOs with cost control and efficiency, the political
clout of organized medicine, and its corresponding role in the
governing framework, depends, to some extent, on the location of
quality on the national agenda. The release of the Institute of
Medicine's report on medical errors in late 1999,73 coupled with the
perception that health care costs were under control and the public was
unhappy with managed care, triggered consideration of reform
legislation, including the Campbell bill.74 The emergence of quality
care on the national agenda alongside access to care and cost
containment bodes well for organized medicine.75 Physicians and their
6sHouse Hearings (1999), supra note 29, at 71.
69See supra note 3.70See supra note 3.71See supra note 12.
72See Ameringer, supra note 25.
73L.T. KOHN, J.M. CORRIGAN § M.S. DONALDSON, EDS., COMMITTEE ON QUAITY OF
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM (National Academy Press 2000).
74See supra note 19.
75See G.J. Bazzoli, S.M. Shortell, F. Ciliberto, P.D. Kralovec § N.L. Dubbs, Tracking
the Changing Landscape: Implications for Health Policy and Practice, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS
195 (2001); Budetti, supra note 17, at 206.
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professional associations will regain some of their political stature so
long as quality is a key concern. But organized medicine must adhere
to professional norms and values. Because the political fortunes of
physicians depend on successful collaborations with other actors, they
risk losing "goodwill" if the public perceives that economic interests
predominate.
Increasing Leverage in Contract Negotiations
In the early 1990s, many experts believed that independent physicians,
hospitals, and insurers eventually would merge or consolidate, forming
integrated systems that delivered health care in an efficient manner at a
reasonable cost.76  They also believed that physician-hospital
organizations (PHOs), independent practice associations (IPAs), and
management services organizations (MSOs) were transitional means for
accomplishing this objective.77 But vertical or centralized forms of
integration (ie., asset purchases and employment relationships) did not
transpire as predicted, and there are strong indications that the entire
process has reversed course.7 8 Some point to disintegration,79 while
others postulate more complex arrangements that feature contractual
linkages rather than ownership of physicians' practices.
80
There are two important reasons why integrated delivery systems
did not materialize as predicted. First, full integration did not give
health plans the flexibility to succeed in markets characterized by
diverse consumer preferences and provider entities. 81 Health plans
could ensure consumer choice and could respond to market change and
innovation if they did not enter into exclusive contracts with or own
provider groups.
Second, most physicians were not comfortable with corporate
arrangements and management practices that reduced their
independence or interfered with their clinical autonomy. Many
physician practice management corporations (PPMCs) failed during the
76Furrow, supra note 28, at 878-884.
77Id
78Bazzoli, supra note 75, at 191.
79See Furrow, supra note 28, at 879.
s°Bazzoli, supra note 75, at 195; Robinson, supra note 15, at 79-80.
81Robinson, supra note 15, at 79-83.821d. at 174; Budetti, supra note 17, at 208.
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83 81990s, and, more recently, IPAs and PHOs also have faltered.84
Though poor management may have contributed to the demise of some
of these entities, medical practice appears ill-suited to global capitation
and bureaucratization. 85 In the words of David Blumenthal, director of
the Institute for Health Policy, MGH/Partners Health Care System, Inc.:
"Investors assumed the work of physician offices could be standardized
and franchised, but the complexity of clinical decision making and
physicians' natural distrust of outside managers have made that
difficult."86
Health markets, in general, remain in flux, and instability among
provider groups is a common feature. 87 Instability occurs when doctors
and hospitals leave, or threaten to leave, a particular health plan,
creating uncertainty and confusion for consumers. Upon visiting
twelve communities throughout the United States, researchers
associated with the Center for Studying Health System Change (HSC)
found that in more than half of the communities (Boston, Greenville,
S.C., Miami, Northern New Jersey, Orange County, Calif., Phoenix,
and Seattle) hospitals and physicians were embroiled in contract
disputes with managed care organizations. 88  The same is true in
Northeastern Wisconsin where Oshkosh physicians, affiliated with
Aurora Health Care, based in Milwaukee, recently severed ties with
Touchpoint Health Plan, located in Appleton. In most of these cases,
disputes typically involved "payment levels, financial risk-sharing
arrangements and accuracy or timeliness of payments." 
89
Some observers believe that these events signal a shift in the
"'Robinson, supra note 15, at 150-177.
aC.S. Lesser & P.B. Ginsburg, Back to the Future? New Cost and Access Challenges Emerge,
Center for Studying Health System Change [hereinafter HSC], No. 35, Feb. 2001; HSC
Community Report [Seattle], Winter 2001; HSC Community Report [Syracuse], Winter 200 1.
85HSC Issue Brief, Wall Street Comes to Washington, No. 43, Sept. 2001; Budetti, supra
note 17, at 208.86HSC Issue Brief, How Physician Organizations are Responding to Managed Care,
No. 20, May 1999.
87A.C. Short et al., Provider Network Instability: Implications for Choice, Costs and
Continuity of Care," HSC Issue Brief, No. 39, June 2001.
"
8B.C. Strunk et al., Health Plan-Provider Showdowns on the Rise, HSC Issue Brief, No.
40, June 2001.
89HSC [June 2001], supra note 87, at 1.
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balance of power from health plans to providers.90 Among them are the
HSC's director of site visits, Cara Lesser. She concludes that "a number
of market forces--including the managed care backlash, consumer
demand for broad choice of physicians and hospitals, rising medical
costs, increased provider consolidation and newly emerging inpatient
capacity constraints--are converging to give many providers the upper
hand in contract negotiations. g"9 1 According to Lesser, "Managed care
as we knew it in the early and mid-1990s appears to be in retreat in both
the commercial market and public programs. With growing provider
clout and increasing resistance to risk-based contracting, there seems to
be a move 'back to the future' in the financing and delivery of health
care.'
92
In addition to these observations, there are other indications that
physicians are regaining their competitive edge. First, there is growing
recognition that "locally-owned, physician-run, and rationally-sized"
organizations are best able to survive in a competitive market.93
Indeed in many communities that HSC surveyed, including Syracuse,
N.Y., Greenville, S.C., 95 Lansing, MI,9 6 and Miami,97 solo or small-
group practices predominated, just as larger entities organized to
manage physicians' practices faltered because capitated contracts with
health plans failed to pay dividends. 98  Second, doctors are building
ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) and specialty hospitals that garner
higher profits for them and compete directly with traditional hospitals
for patients. 99 In Phoenix, for example, many specialists own ASCs
and demand high fees from hospitals in order to provide emergency
90See HSC, supra notes 87 and 88. Cf., Bazzoli, supra note 75, at 194; M.B. Rosenthal,
B.E. Landon, and H.A. Huskamp, Managed Care and Market Power: Physician Organizations
in Four Markets, 20 HEALTH AFFAS 192 (2001).
91HSC News Release, Health Plan-Provider Contract Showdowns Trigger Network
Instability *June 28, 2001).92Lesser, supra note 84, at 4.
93HSC Issue Brief, How Physician Organizations are Responding to Managed Care,
No. 20, May 1999. Cf., Robinson, supra note 15, at 79.
94HSC Community Report [Syracuse], Winter 2001.
95HSC Community Report [Greenville, S.C.], Spring 2001.
96HSC Community Report [Lansing, MI], Winter 2001.
97HSC Community Report [Miami], Summer 2001.
98Lesser, supra note 84, at 3.
991d.
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room care.100 Third, some doctors are leaving managed care altogether
and are starting so-called "concierge practices" that cater to patients
who can afford to pay out-of-pocket in exchange for more personalized
care (house calls, etc.). 10 1
Finally, as health costs increase, yet physicians remain unwilling
to negotiate with health plans to share risk or reduce fees, large
employers may bypass IHiMOs altogether and enter into contracts with
provider groups. These so-called "disintermediated plans" permit
employees free choice of provider under financing arrangements similar
in nature to medical savings accounts. 10 2  Disintermediated plans
represent the antithesis of liMOs and, in effect, would foster a return to
fee-for-service medicine and provider control of service delivery. -
CONCLUSION
The evidence supports the belief that physicians and their professional
associations are regaining political clout and economic leverage.
Because it is likely that doctors will have a strong stake in the emerging
market for health care services, decision makers must consider their
interests, as well as those of consumers, insurers, and MCOs. Many
prominent researchers and analysts now believe that health plans often
have overlooked or have paid inadequate attention to issues of
importance to physicians in discussions concerning integration.10 3 The
implications are that physicians are resisting pressures to merge with
health plans and institutional providers, and they increasingly are vocal
in their disputes with MCOs.
Two central themes resonate in this context. The first is that the
devolution of policy making from federal to state and local
governments, outward to the private sector, and outside the regulatory
box strengthens the authority of the medical profession. Absent a
national health policy that favors corporate medicine, physicians will
collaborate with consumers to promote patient-focused, rather than
population-based, care; absent public pressures to integrate,
'
00HSC Community Report [Phoenix], Winter 2001.
'O'D. Friedman, Dr. Levine's Dilemma, N.Y TIMES MAG. (May 5,2002).
'
02J.V. Jacobi & N. Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and
Disintermediation in Managed Care, 29 J.L., MED; & Emcs 311 (2001).103 Budetti, supra note 17, at 208.
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independent physicians and small group practices will flourish; absent
federal resistance, physicians will collaborate among themselves to
further self-regulation and to oppose managed care.
Medical practice and corporate management are uneasy partners.
The health care industry is labor intensive, information is imperfect and
asymmetrical, patient care often is of an emergency or semi-emergency
nature, results are ambiguous, there is a high degree of specialization,
and physicians are difficult to control.104 Physicians and consumers
have resisted corporate bureaucracy, not only because physicians
distrust external oversight, but also because consumers value
personalized care.
The second theme concerns the emergence of quality on the health
care agenda. Though health systems instituted treatment protocols,
practice guidelines, and other devices to enhance quality, patients
reacted adversely to perceived threats concerning their choice of
provider and interference with medical judgment. Most of these
concerns, often fueled by physicians, stemmed from utilization review,
gatekeeper strategies, and financial incentives placed on doctors to limit
medical services. Patients viewed physicians as their advocates against
cost-conscious and profit-hungry HMOs. The so-called "managed care
backlash" that gained momentum during the 1990s led to legislation
that was intended to protect consumers, but also favored physicians,
such as any-willing-provider laws, restrictions on gag clauses in
managed-care contracts, and prompt payment laws. Capitalizing on
this momentum, physicians and their professional associations backed
an antitrust exemption that would allow independent practitioners to
bargain collectively with MCOs. Though most attempts to enact such
legislation thus far have failed, federal and state agencies have relaxed
their regulatory restrictions on forming physician networks, as well as
their efforts to enforce existing laws.
Concerns about the commercialization of medical practice also
have augured court opinions. Though the Supreme Court rejected the
"learned professions" exemption in Goldfarb, it indicated in footnote 17
that professions might receive special treatment under the antitrust
laws. But until the norm of quality achieved prominence on the
'4S.L. Walston et al., Owned Vertical Integration and Health Care: Promise and
Performance, 21 HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT REV. 88 (1996).
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national agenda, the courts rarely invoked professional norms and
values to justify anticompetitive activities. The Supreme Court's
decision in California Dental resurrects footnote 17 and, at least,
bolsters the claim that ethical restrictions on commercial practices
deserve special consideration for reasons related to quality of care.
The resurgence of professional power and authority has broad
implications for future health policy. Despite a more fragmented
profession than existed in the era before managed care, physicians and
their professional associations have acquired the capacity to respond to
political and economic challenges to their interests and beliefs. They
are more sophisticated in their business dealings, they are more
effective in their political collaborations with consumer groups, and
they have gained bargaining leverage with MCOs. By the same token,
MCOs are not in the same position that they once were. They are no
longer a novelty; their techniques have been tried and tested--some
work and some do not; much of the savings from managed care already
has been extracted from the health care system in the form of reduced
duplication and fees, and the standardization of certain clinical
protocols and procedures; finally, the public is less tolerant of high
corporate earnings at the expense of patient care.
But enhanced professional authority should not eclipse the
economic principles that managed care represents. As Rosemary
Stevens asserts, "making managed care the 'fall guy' for necessary (and
overdue) rationalization of the medical marketplace seems misguided,
even counterproductive, as a long-range strategy for any actual or
would-be policy group."'1 5 Many physicians, moreover, are owners
and managers of MCOs. Rather than counter managed care, medicine
should collaborate and participate in a health-policy debate that
frequently has neglected professional values and concerns. Because the
federal government and business again must stem rising costs and
decreasing access to care, medicine has a fresh opportunity to engage in
the policy-making process.
105Stevens, supra note 4, at 340.
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